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Introduction
Altruism refers to a willingness to benefit others, even at one's own expense. Selfishness, the opposite of altruism, refers to prioritizing one's own interests, with a concomitant lack of consideration for others. While these definitions may seem clear, it is difficult to detect from an agent's actions alone whether he is truly altruistic or selfish.
Even if an agent is indifferent to the welfare of others and therefore selfish by definition, he might nevertheless act as if he were truly altruistic (i.e., act to benefit others) out of selfish concerns triggered when his action is observed; that is, he might seek to feel pride in having acted altruistically and to avoid the shame of having acted selfishly.
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In contrast to pure altruism, we say that an agent exhibits impure altruism if he chooses an action that benefits others in order to feel pride in acting altruistically and to avoid the shame of acting selfishly. (In this paper, the terms altruism and pure altruism will be used interchangeably, as will the terms selfishness and pure selfishness.)
On the other hand, even if an agent is willing to benefit others and is therefore by definition altruistic, he might nevertheless give in to the temptation to act selfishly. In contrast to pure selfishness, we say that an agent exhibits impure selfishness if the temptation to act selfishly motivates him to depart from his tendency to act altruistically. 2 An agent can exhibit impure selfishness, especially when an immediate payoff is at stake.
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Moreover, these three forces-pride, shame, and the temptation to act selfishly-could interact in conflicting ways in affecting an agent's actions. 4 For example, an agent could behave impurely altruistically even if he feels a temptation to act selfishly, when his desire to avoid the shame has overwhelmed the temptation. Conversely, an agent could behave impurely selfishly even if he knows that he will feel shame at doing so, when the temptation has overwhelmed such shame. Therefore, existing models capturing only one of the forces, temptation or shame, cannot capture an agent's impure altruism and impure selfishness.
Given that altruism is a fundamental source of human cooperation, it is crucial to distinguish altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness. The purpose of this paper is to axiomatizes a model that makes the distinction behaviorally. In the model, unique real numbers separately capture altruism as well as pride in acting altruistically, shame of acting selfishly, and the temptation to act selfishly. The model can capture the trade-off between the three forces and, thereby, distinguish altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness. For example, we can show that the agent could behave impurely altruistically if his index of shame is larger than that of the temptation;
otherwise, an agent could behave impurely selfishly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide preview of results.
In Section 3, we present the axioms. In Section 4, we present a representation theorem, 2 Of course, such an agent could also be said to exhibit impure altruism, since his altruistic tendencies could be seen as rendered "impure" whenever he gives in to the temptation to act selfishly. However, we feel that the term impure altruism is more suitable for the selfish person who acts altruistically when motivated by his inherent selfishness. As a result, we use the term impure selfishness for the opposite situation, namely, a typically altruistic agent who sometimes gives in to the temptation to act selfishly. 3 Indeed, in experiments on dictator games, Noor and Ren (2011) found that the average donation from dictators to receivers is 65 percent of the total endowment when the payment to subjects is made one month later, but only 38 percent when the payment is made immediately after the dictators' choices. 4 Throughout this paper, when we use the terms, pride in acting altruistically, shame of acting selfishly, and the temptation to act selfishly, we are referring to individual acts of an agent, and not to an agent's personality or general tendencies. For example, if we say that an agent seeks to "feel pride in acting altruistically," that description will refer to the pride in one particular altruistic act, rather than to the agent's typical or habitual behavior.
the uniqueness of the representation, and characterization of the parameters. In Section 5,  we show that the model is consistent with recent experimental evidence. In Section 6, we provide two applications. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss limitations of the model and the related literature. The proofs of results in Section 4 are in Appendix A.
Preview of Results

The model
We investigate a decision maker who determines an allocation between himself and other passive agents. The decision maker's choice consists of two stages. In the first ex-ante stage, the decision maker chooses a set of allocations. We assume that the other agents do not know that the decision maker has such choices. His ex-ante choices are private.
In the ex-post stage, the decision maker chooses an allocation from the set that he chose ex-ante. We assume that other agents can observe which allocation the decision maker chooses from the set, even though they do not know that he chose the set ex-ante.
Ex-post Ex-ante
Choose a set A of allocations privately
Choose an allocation from the set A publicly Because his choices will be public at the ex-post public stage, the decision maker could anticipate that he will feel pride in acting altruistically, or shame of acting selfishly at that stage. In addition, the decision maker could anticipate that he will suffer from the temptation to act selfishly ex-post. In light of these potential ex-post feelings, the decision maker chooses a set ex-ante. (We, henceforth, call these three feelings simply, pride, shame, and temptation, when there is no danger of confusion.)
To introduce the model, we first define some notation. The decision maker is denoted by 1 and the finite set of other agents is denoted by S. Define I = {1} ∪ S to be the set of all agents. A payoff profile p ≡ (p i ) i∈I is called an allocation. An allocation p is also denoted by (p 1 , p S ), where p 1 is a payoff to the decision maker and p S ≡ (p i ) i∈S is a payoff profile to the other agents.
In the model, the decision maker is a utilitarian. As we explain in the next section, when the decision maker chooses an allocation at either stage, he maximizes the weighted sum of his utility α 1 u(p) and the other agents' utilities u S (p S ) ≡ ∑ i∈S α i u(p i ), where α 1 > 0 and ∑ i∈S α i = 1. Hence, we call the model a generalized utilitarian (GU) model. When the decision maker chooses a set of allocations at the ex-ante private stage, he maximizes the following utility function. The utility of a set A is :
where β 1 < 1 and β S ≥ 0.
In the model, the maximizer p over A is the decision maker's ex-post public choice from
A. The first term of the GU model,
captures the decision maker's utilitarian evaluation of his ex-post choice of p.
The second term, β 1 max q ∈A α 1 (u(q 1 ) − u(p 1 )), captures the utility arising from the pride of acting altruistically if β 1 ≥ 0 or the disutility arising from the temptation to act selfishly if β 1 ≤ 0. The utility and disutility are proportional to the difference between the maximum selfish utility max q∈A α 1 u(q 1 ) and the actual utility α 1 u(p 1 ) attained by the decision maker's ex-post choice of p. The difference captures how much the decision maker controls himself so as to keep himself from acting selfishly (i.e., from maximizing his selfish interest).
Similarly, the third term of the GU model, β S max r∈A (u S (r S ) − u S (p S )), captures the disutility of shame of acting selfishly. The disutility is proportional to the difference between the maximum social utilities max r∈A u S (r S ) ≡ max r∈A ∑ i∈S α i u(r i ) (i.e., the maximum sum of the utilities of the other agents) and the actual social utilities u S (p S ) ≡ ∑ i∈S α i u(p i ) attained by the decision maker's ex-post choice of p. Hence, the difference captures how much utility the other agents lose because of the decision maker's ex-post choice.
α captures altruism/selfishness; β captures impure altruism/selfishness
In the GU model, 1/α 1 captures the level of pure altruism. To see this interpretation of α 1 , note that whether the decision maker is purely altruistic or not is determined through his ex-ante private choices. This is because in private choices, the the decision maker would feel neither pride nor shame. Moreover, in ex-ante choices, he would not feel temptation.
In the GU model, ex-ante private choices between allocations, say, between p and q , are formalized as choices between the singleton sets, such as {p} and {q }. Hence, the level of altruism is captured by 1/α 1 as follows:
Therefore, the smaller α 1 is, the more the decision maker is willing to sacrifice his own allocation p 1 to improve the others' allocations p S .
Impure Altruism
Impure Selfishness 0 Pride Temptation In contrast to the ex-ante private choices, ex-post public choices can be affected by pride, shame, and the temptation to act selfishly. To see this effect, note that (1) can be expressed
for all A ∈ A . This representation shows that the ex-post public choice p (i.e., the maximizer over A) maximizes
Note that since β 1 < 1, the function U is monotonic in the decision maker's utility u(p 1 ) and the social utility u S (p S ). Hence, the decision maker will not derive utility from decreasing his own utility (or social utility) unless it increases social utility (or his own utility, respectively).
A comparison between (3) and (2) shows that the decision maker's choices become more altruistic at the ex-post public stage (i.e., in (3)) than they are at the ex-ante private stage (i.e., in (2)) if and only if β S > −β 1 . To see this note that the relative weight on the social utility u S at the ex-post public stage is (1 + β S )/((1 − β 1 )α 1 ). The relative weight at the ex-ante private stage is 1/α 1 . Hence, the relative weight at the ex-post public stage is higher than the relative weight at the ex-ante private stage if and only if 1 + β S > 1 − β 1 .
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In this way, β S > −β 1 captures impure altruism caused by pride in acting altruistically or shame of acting selfishly. In the same way, β S < −β 1 captures impure selfishness motivated by the temptation to act selfishly.
Experimental evidence and applications
The GU model can describe recent experimental evidence on dictator games with an exit option. In the experiments, when a dictator exited, he obtained the whole endowment, while the receivers obtained nothing without knowing that this was a consequence of the dictator's choice. About one-third of subjects exited, but when the same subjects played a standard dictator game without the exit option, they donated a positive amount to the receivers. As we observe in Section 5, this tendency to exit is inconsistent with Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) well-known model of warm glow as well as any models of inequality aversion that are monotonic on constant allocations.
The GU model can describe not only the choice of exit but also the tendency for both low-level and high-level donors to play (i.e., not exit) the dictator games more often than medium-level donors. Capturing this tendency would be important because the tendency has an important implication in increasing the amount of donations: screening is necessary to induce high-level donations.
In addition, we show that the GU model is consistent with two classical empirical puzzles involving charitable donations. First, standard consumer theory, which assumes that consumers' preferences are solely defined on allocations, predicts that government spending for charity should completely crowd out their donation. However, empirical evidence suggests that the crowding out is far from complete, and is at most about 50 percent. (See Andreoni (2006) for a survey of the evidence.) By applying the GU model, we describe the partial crowding out under the condition that consumers' pride dominates their shame (i.e.,
Second, standard consumer theory predicts that redistribution of income by the government does not affect the total donation of consumers. However, an empirical study by Hochman and Rodgers (1973) shows that total donation of consumers is sensitive to distribution of income across consumers. By applying the GU model, we show that the redistribution between a consumer whose pride dominates their shame (i.e., β 1 > β S ) and a consumer who does not exhibit neither pride nor shame (i.e., β 1 = 0 = β S ) affects the sum of donations. The GU model does not incorporate inequality aversion because the GU model implies that the decision maker is a utilitarian. This feature may not be so restrictive, given our purpose. Since the model of inequality aversion is defined solely on allocations, the model inherently cannot distinguish altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness, which is the main purpose of our paper. To incorporate inequality aversion, we axiomatize an extended GU model where u S is a maxmin utility function, in Appendix B.
Relationship with
Axioms
First, remember that the decision maker is denoted by 1 and the finite set of other agents is denoted by S. Hence, I ≡ {1} ∪ S is the set of all agents. Let Z be a finite set. A lottery is a probability distribution over Z. We denote the set of lotteries by ∆(Z). For simplicity, we assume that a payoff for each agent is a lottery. Hence, the set of allocations is (∆(Z)) I .
Note that outcomes of lotteries are not correlated across agents. We denote the set of all nonempty closed subsets of (∆(Z)) I by A . An element of A is called a set.
The primitive of our model is a binary relation ≿ on A that describes the decision maker's ex-ante private preference. Eliciting such preferences would be possible in double-blinded experiments. In typical double-blinded experiments, experimenters (as well as receivers)
cannot know the identify of subjects but the experimenters can observe the subjects' choices.
We denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of ≿ by ≻ and ∼, respectively. We endow A with the topology generated by the Hausdorff metric.
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We use the following notation. Sets are denoted by A, B, and C ∈ A . Allocations are denoted by p, q, l, and r ∈ (∆(Z)) I . Lotteries are denoted by p, q, l, and r ∈ ∆(Z). In particular, lotteries for agent i ∈ I are denoted by p i , q i , l i , and r i ∈ ∆(Z). We define convex combinations of two sets, two allocations, and two lotteries in the usual manner. 7 For a singleton set, we write p instead of {p}.
The first three axioms are standard ones.
Axiom (Ex-ante Rationality): ≿ is a nondegenerate, complete, transitive, and continuous binary relation. 
8 Formally, the continuity is defined as follows: the sets {B ∈ A |B ≿ A} and {B ∈ A |A ≿ B} are closed in the Hausdorff metric topology.
Axiom (Independence): A ≿ B if and only if
We define the decision maker's risk preference ≿ 1 on ∆(Z) and social preference ≿ S on (∆(Z)) S as follows:
The binary relation ≿ 1 captures the decision maker's individual risk preference, and ≿ S captures his social preference (i.e., his preference on other agents' allocations), which reflects the decision maker's belief about the other agents' preferences. 9 To see these interpretations, note that in part (i) of the definition, the two allocations differ only with respect to the decision maker's allocations, so that his choice between the two allocations does not affect other agents' allocations. Hence, the decision maker would allow himself to choose one based solely on his selfish preference.
Similarly, in part (ii) of the definition, the two allocations differ only with respect to other agents' allocations, so that the decision maker's choice between the two allocations does not affect his own allocation. Hence, the decision maker should choose one to maximize the anticipated welfare of other agents.
The next axiom requires that ≿ satisfy a Pareto condition.
This Pareto condition is different from the standard Pareto condition in the sense that the decision maker uses his own selfish preference ≿ 1 to evaluate the other agents' allocations p i̸ =1 . This is because the decision maker here is not a social planner and might not know the other agents' preferences.
To define our key axiom, Dominance, we introduce the following definition: Hence, the decision maker should weakly prefer A ∪ p to A because p might be optimal expost. However, if p is jointly dominated by a single allocation both for his selfish preference and for the social preference, then the decision maker should not choose p ex-post. Hence, the decision maker should be indifferent between A∪p and A. The following axiom expresses the above observations formally:
We identify the decision maker's ex-post preference as follows: if p is respectively dominated in A but the decision maker still prefers A ∪ p to A, then he must prefer p to q ∈ A ex-post. This is because the only reason that the decision maker could prefer A ∪ p to A is his ex-post preference since adding p to A does not cause the utility arising from pride in acting altruistically. Formally,
We assume the following weak rationality condition on the ex-post preference:
Axiom (Ex-post Rationality): ≻ ′ is nondegenerate and asymmetric.
The last axiom captures shame of acting selfishly: the decision maker feels shame when his ex-post choice is judged inferior by the social preference ≿ S . Hence, the decision maker might have a preference for commitment in order to exclude the socially superior allocation from his choice set as follows:
We provide the axioms of pride and the temptation in the next section. Our representation is general enough to allow both phenomena. such that ≿ is represented by
where
there is no
By the definitions, the theorem trivially implies that ≿ 1 and ≿ S are represented by u 1 and u S , respectively. In the GU model, the parameters α and β are unique.
Remark:
If two GU models with (u, α, β) and 
Pride in Acting Altruistically and Temptation to Act Selfishly
The next axiom captures a decision maker's temptation to act selfishly (i.e., the temptation to maximize his own allocation). Because of this temptation, the decision maker might prefer to commit himself to a smaller choice set in order to minimize the cost of self-control.
In contrast, by not choosing such selfish allocations, a decision maker might feel pride in acting altruistically. Hence, such a decision maker might have a preference for flexibility so that he could publicly keep himself from choosing such selfish allocations.
Axiom (Pride in Acting Altruistically
): p ≻ ′ q and q 1 ≻ 1 p 1 ⇒ {p, q } ≿ {p}.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ≿ is represented by the GU model with (u, α, β). (i) ≿ exhibits pride in acting altruistically if and only if
(ii) ≿ exhibits the temptation to act selfishly if and only if β 1 ≤ 0.
Impure Altruism and Impure Selfishness
We say that a decision maker exhibits impure altruism if he acts to benefit others' allocations because of pride in acting altruistically and shame of acting selfishly. If such a decision maker, at the ex-ante private stage, weakly prefers an allocation that is ranked superior by his social preference ≿ S , then at the ex-post public stage, he should strictly prefer the same allocation because the pride and the shame are triggered by the publicness of the choice.
In contrast, we say that a decision maker exhibits impure selfishness if the temptation to act selfishly motivates him to diverge from his ex-ante choices. If such a decision maker, at the ex-ante stage, weakly prefers an allocation that is ranked superior by his selfish preference ≿ 1 , then he should strictly prefer the same allocation at the ex-post stage.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ≿ is represented by the GU model with (u, α, β). (i) ≿ exhibits impure altruism if and only if β
(ii) ≿ exhibits impure selfishness if and only if β S < −β 1 .
Consistency with Experiments
In this section, we show that the GU model is consistent with recent experimental evidence on dictator games with an exit option. Before describing the evidence, we clarify the meaning of public in the experiments. We call a dictator's choice public if playing dictator games is common knowledge among subjects, even though a receiver does not know the identity of his paired dictator. Given the common knowledge, the dictator would consider the receiver's wish that the dictator should behave altruistically. but the option ensured that receivers never knew the choice of exit. So, by using the exit option, dictators could consume the whole endowment (minus the cost of exit, if any) and leave nothing to receivers-without feeling shame of acting selfishly. 11 In these experiments, about one-third of subjects used the exit option privately, but when the same subjects played a standard dictator game without the exit option, they donated a positive amount to the receivers.
Moreover, the most recent experiments conducted by Lazear et al. (2012) found two interesting correlations between the choice of exit and the proportion donated: (i) when playing the dictator game is subsidized, the medium-level donors exit more often than both 10 Given the common knowledge, the dictator knows that the receiver knows that a dictator determines the receiver's allocation. Hence, the dictator would consider the receiver's wish. 11 An experimenter observed the choice of exit. This is consistent with our model because the experimenter is an outside observer (i.e., the subjects' choices should not affect the experimenter's welfare). The theory of inequality aversion and Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) model of warm glow are inconsistent with this robust tendency to exit, not to mention tendencies (i) and (ii). In both theories, whether the dictator's choice is private or public does not make any difference in his utility. Moreover, by playing the dictator game, the dictator can allocate the whole endowment and the subsidy arbitrarily between himself and the receiver. Hence, the theory of inequality aversion and Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) model of warm glow predict that any subjects should not use the exit option. By the same reason, the tendency to exit is inconsistent with any other-regarding preferences that are monotonic on constant allocations.
To see that the GU model is consistent with these tendencies, note that the singleton set {(w, 0)} corresponds to exiting with endowment w; the set
corresponds to playing the dictator game publicly with total endowment w + τ , where τ > 0 is the subsidy and τ < 0 is the cost of playing the game. Hence, subjects exit if and only if
Note also that the donation decreases as the index α 1 of selfishness increases. Hence, the medium-level donors correspond to subjects whose α 1 is medium level and the lower-level donors correspond to subjects whose α 1 is higher level. 12 The assumption that α 1 ≥ 1 is consistent with the robust evidence that most dictators donate less than half of the endowment in dictator games. 13 For simplicity, we assume that the decision maker exits if he is indifferent.
Proof of Proposition
To show the proposition. It suffices to show the following: 
Note that (II) means that extremely selfish subjects exit if and only if τ < 0; (III-a) means that the altruistic subject with α 1 = 1 always plays the game; and (III-b) means that some subjects exit the game. Hence, (II) and (III) together with the strict concavity of f (i.e.,(I)) imply the proposition. (See Figure 4 for an illustration.
14 )
To show the claim, first note that since u ′ > 0, α 1 ≥ 0, β 1 < 1, and β S ≥ 0, the budget constraint is binding (i.e., c
where c * is the maximizer. (I) and (II) follow from direct calculations. 15 To prove claim (III), suppose that α 1 = 1 and
Since f is continuous in τ and β S , there exist desirable β S and τ . ■ Conclusion (i) in Proposition 3 claims that the subjects whose α 1 is medium-level tend to exit when playing the dictator game is subsidized. Conclusion (ii) claims that the subjects whose α 1 is higher-level tend to exit when playing the game is costly. Since the donation decreases as α 1 increases, conclusion (i) and (ii) capture tendencies (i) and (ii), respectively.
14 In Figure 4 , we assume that u(x) = log(x + 1), β 1 = .8, β S = 5, and w = 10. We also assume that τ = 1 in the left figure and τ = −1 in the right figure.
15 To prove claim (I), note that by the envelop theorem,
the optimal donation and strictly decreasing in α 1 . To prove claim (II), note that since d
Hence, by a direct calculation, lim α1→∞
Applications
In this section, we describe two empirical puzzles involving charitable donations: (i) government spending only partially crowds out consumers' donations, even though standard consumer theory predicts that the crowding out should be complete; (ii) redistribution of income by the government affects the total donation of consumers, contrary to the prediction based on standard consumer theory.
In his well-known paper, Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 ) has obtained conditions that capture these two puzzles. However, his conditions are not closed-form expressions: the conditions are imposed on derivatives of the first-order conditions. On the other hand, in the following, we obtain conditions on the unique parameters, namely α and β, to capture these two puzzles.
Moreover, Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) approach is essentially different from ours. In his model of warm glow, the decision maker donates even if it is private to the other agents and does not improve the welfare of the other agents. Hence, Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 ) approach does not need inter-temporal frameworks, in contrast to our following approach.
Partial Crowding Out
We consider the following two-period decision problem. Period 1 consists of ex-ante private and ex-post public stages. At the ex-ante private stage, the decision maker divides his income e between the saving s for Period 2 and the budget w for the ex-post public stage. At the ex-post public stage, the decision maker divides his budget w between his donation d and his consumption c. At Period 2, the decision maker consumes the saving s privately. 16 We assume that the decision maker's preference is separable across the two periods and that his utility at each period is represented by the GU model. Then, for any time-discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and government spending g and tax τ , the decision maker's problem at the 
subject to s + w ≤ e. 17 Given the optimal budget w * (g, τ ), the decision maker's problem at the ex-post stage of Period 1 is:
We denote the optimal donation (i.e., the solution d to 
Proposition 4
Suppose that (a) government spending is financed by tax (i.e., g = τ ) and 
his donation is crowded out completely. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Defined
≡ d * + τ = d * + g for τ = g,
g)|d
If β 1 = 0 = β S , then h does not depend on τ (i.e., g), so that the solutiond is constant in g. Hence, (ii) holds. To show (i), assume
We show thatd(τ ) is strictly increasing. Given
Therefore, by the standard result on monotone comparative statics,
(See Milgrom and Shannon (1994, Theorem 5 and 6) for the result.) Hence, by the envelop theorem,
By the implicit function theorem, a direct calculation shows that
Therefore, by the monotone comparative statics again,d is strictly increasing in τ (i.e., g). ■
To see the result intuitively, note that
, where c * and d * are the optimal consumption and the optimal donation respectively. Under the assumption that α 1 ≥ 1, if
caused by pride and shame is increasing in w. 20 Therefore, when τ increases, the decision maker would increase w to compensate this increase of τ . This increase of w maintains the level of donations, which implies that the crowding out will be only partial.
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. By the implicit function theorem, 20 By the envelop theorem, the derivative of the difference is
Hence, the derivative of the difference is positive because β 1 α 1 > β S .
Redistribution Non-Neutrality
To capture the redistribution non-neutrality, we consider two agents X and Y who make the same decisions as in the previous section simultaneously at the ex-ante private stage. For simplicity, we assume that agent Y is purely altruistic (i.e., β 
Given the optimal budget w * i (d j , τ i ), the decision maker's problem at the ex-post stage of Period 1 is (ii) If agent X is also purely altruistic (i.e., β 1 = 0 = β S ), then the redistribution does not affect the total equilibrium donation.
Proof of Proposition 5: Nash equilibria are characterized by the first order conditions:
21
Then by the Cramer's rule,
, where the matrix A is obtained by sub- 
22 By calculation,
where 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we axiomatized the GU model, in which unique real numbers separately captures altruism as well as pride in acting altruistically, shame of acting selfishly, and the temptation to act selfishly. We can distinguish altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness by using the unique real numbers. In this section, we discuss the limitations of the model and related literature.
First, in the GU model, the decision maker evaluates the other agents' allocations (p i ) i∈S by using his own utility function u. 24 Whether this feature is restrictive or not depends on the context where we apply the GU model. For example, evaluating allocations by linear utility function would be a good approximation in experiments with small stakes because subjects tend to be risk neutral in such experiments. Moreover, by using additional primitive preferences (≿ i ) i∈S of the other agents, we could immediately obtain an extension of the GU model in which each agent's allocation p i is evaluated by the agent's utility function u i representing ≿ i .
Second, in the GU model, only the most selfish allocation and the most altruistic allocation cause pride, shame, and the temptation to act selfishly for the decision maker. Because of this feature, the GU model could not fully incorporate menu-dependent choices, such as violations of the independence of an irrelevant alternative (IIA) axiom. At the same time,
this feature makes the model tractable and facilitates distinguishing altruism from impure altruism and selfishness from impure selfishness, which is the main purpose of our paper.
In the following, we discuss the related literature. This paper is not the first to study impure altruism. Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 has proposed the celebrated model of warm glow. 24 This limitation originates from the Pareto axiom in which the decision maker uses his own selfish preference ≿ 1 to evaluate the other agents' allocations. By using the model, Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 ) has obtained conditions that capture the partial crowding out and the redistribution non-neutrality, although the conditions are not closedform expressions. Providing axiomatic foundation is outside the scope of Andreoni (1989 Andreoni ( , 1990 ).
Donations captured by Andreoni's (1989 Andreoni's ( , 1990 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose a general model of temptation. However, they do not study social decision making in particular. In their model, moreover, the self-control problem is captured by the difference between two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. In contrast, we study a specific temptation in a social context: the temptation to act selfishly.
Moreover, the GU model captures the self-control problem by the unique nonnegative number β 1 , which facilitates distinguishing selfishness from impure selfishness. Menu dependence of temptation is an importance issue but orthogonal to the main issue in our paper. As a result, we have not studied the menu dependence in our paper. (2011) 
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Appendix
A Proofs
In this section, we prove the theorem. First we show the sufficiency of the axioms. Fix ≿ that satisfies the axioms in the theorem. The next lemma provides representations for ≿ 1 and ≿ S .
Lemma 1 There exist a mixture-linear function u 1 on ∆(Z) and positive numbers {α
. Suppose by way of contradiction
q S ) and (l 1 ,
. This is a contradiction. By the same way, we can show that ≿ S is well defined.
To show ≿ 1 satisfies Independence, fix p 1 , q 1 , l 1 ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any 
is also closed by the continuity of u 1 and u S .
Since 
where u(A) = A * and u(B) = B * . Next lemma shows the properties of ≿ * .
Axiom (Independence*): A * ≿ * B * if and only if αA
Definition: (i) u is respectively dominated in A * if there exist elements v and w in A * such
Lemma 2 ≿ * is a well-defined complete, transitive, and continuous binary relation that
satisfies Independence* and Strong Dominance*. 
Proof of Lemma
topology. 25 To show (i), suppose that any p n ∈ B is respectively dominated in A. Then, by Therefore, the claim (ii) shows that A ∼ A ∪ B. In the same way, we can show B ∼ A ∪ B.
By the definition of ≿ * , the claims (i) and (ii) show that ≿ * satisfies Strong Dominance*.
Since ≿ is a complete and transitive binary relation that satisfies Independence, so is ≿ * .
In the following, we show that ≿ * is continuous. 
In the same way, we can show that {B For any x ∈ R 2 and ε ∈ R ++ , we denote {y ∈ R 2 |∥x − y∥ ≤ ε} by B ε (x ).
Axiom (Lower Continuity*): If u ≻ ′ * v then there exists a positive number ε such that
Lemma 3 (i) ≻ ′ * is a nondegenerate and asymmetric binary relation satisfies Ex-post Independence* and Lower Continuity*. (ii) For any
A * ∈ A * , there exists u ∈ A * such that u ≿ ′ * v for all v ∈ A * .
Hence to show (i), it suffices to show that
By the transitivity, αu
is convex. Therefore, it follows from Sonnenschein (1971, Theorem 4) that there exists
Now, we show a general representation for ≿ * .
Lemma 4 There exists a function
µ : R → R such that V * (A * ) = ∑ λ∈R ( max u∈A * λu 1 + (1 − λ)u S ) µ(λ) represents ≿ * . Moreover, supp(µ) ≡ {λ ∈ R|µ(λ) ̸ = 0} is finite.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Step 1: (i) There exist finite sets K and L of mixture-linear utility functions on 
Normalize each U ∈ K ∪ L by adding a constant number so as to obtain U (0, 0) = 0.
Step 2:
.
Proof of Step
2 . Consider the case where
The other case where u 1 + u S ≤ 1 can be proved in the same way.
Suppose by way of contradiction that
This contradicts with Step 1 (ii). □
For all λ ∈ R define
Note that µ is well defined because for any
. Therefore, by Step 1 and Step 2, we establish Lemma 4. Moreover, since K and L are finite, ) and any λ ∈ R. Then, λu * 
Proof of Lemma
1 (λ) + (1 − λ)u * S (λ) = 1 2 + ε∥(λ, 1 − λ)∥ ≥ 1 2 + ∥u − ( 1 2 , 1 2 )∥∥(λ, 1 − λ)∥ ≥ 1 2 + (u − ( 1 2 , 1 2 )) · (λ, 1 − λ) = λu 1 + (1 − λ)u S ,
Lemma 6 (i) For any
There exists unique λ
Proof of Lemma 6: To show (i), suppose by way of contradiction that there exists
. This is a contradiction. Hence, (i) holds.
To show (ii), choose any λ 
Dominance* (i) shows
To show (iii), suppose by way of contradiction that there exist no λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Since ≿ satisfies Pareto, it must hold that µ(1) > 0 and µ(0) > 0. However, this implies that if u is respectively dominated in A * (i.e., v 1 ≥ u 1 and w S ≥ u S for some 
is respectively dominated by u * (0) and such that u 1 > v 1 . Choose positive numbers ε and η such that ε < min{u 1 , u S } and
Then by Shame of Acting Selfishly,
By using Lemma 4 and 6, we can show the sufficiency of the axioms. By the lemmas,
Hence, for all u
, and β S = −µ(0).
Then, α 1 > 0. By Lemma 6 (iii), β 1 < 1. By Lemma 6 (iv), β S ≥ 0. By substituting (8) to (7), we obtain V * (A * ) = max u∈A * (
. Hence, V represents ≿. By arranging the terms and substituting u 1 = u 1 (p 1 ) and u S = u S (p S ), we obtain the GU model.
To show that the maximizer p over A is a maximal element of ≻ ′ in A, we show the following.
S such that u 1 (p 1 ) = u 1 and u S (p S ) = u S . 30 By the normalization and the definitions, 
Proof of Lemma
) i∈S , and
Since g is continuous and V (z) > g(0) > V (z), there exists a positive number a such that
By the continuity, there exists
To make notation simple, 
B Extension
In this section, to incorporate inequality aversion, we axiomatize an extended GU model, in which u S is a maxmin utility function. We consider a decision maker who is inequality-averse among other agents' allocations. 
C Discussion on Experiments
Since two tendencies (i) and (ii) have not been extensively discussed in the experimental papers, we describe these tendencies in detail in this section. We also observe that the tendencies are robust even in experiments in which receivers could not identify dictators. Moreover, in a field experiment, Della Vigna et al. (2011) found consistent evidence for 33 We regressed donated proportion on subsidy size. The estimated coefficient on the subsidy size is −1.6 · 10 −4 (p = 0.887), which is not significantly different from zero. Hence, the donated proportion is statistically constant across the treatments. 34 We made the left figure of Figure 3 based on the no-anonymity treatment in Experiment 2 in Lazear et al. (2012) . 35 We made the right figure of Figure 3 
tendency (ii).
